Skip to content

Home About Curriculum Our Work News Support Us

Curriculum› Law & Economics: Crime, Contracts & Courts› Law & Economics: Checkpoint 1

Checkpoint quiz · Law & Economics: Crime, Contracts & Courts

Law & Economics: Checkpoint 1

Quick checkpoint - five questions on incentives, deterrence, prisons, the Coase theorem and contracts.

Quick checkpoint - five questions on incentives, deterrence, prisons, the Coase theorem and contracts.

Question 1 of 5 In Gary Becker's model, what makes up the expected punishment for a crime?

Only the length of the prison sentence The chance of being caught multiplied by the size of the penalty The value of the stolen goods The number of police officers in the country

Expected punishment combines how likely punishment is with how large it would be.

Question 2 of 5 What does research generally find about deterring crime?

Severity of punishment matters far more than certainty Neither certainty nor severity has any effect The certainty of being caught deters more than the severity of the punishment Only fines deter crime, not prison

People discount distant costs and rarely know sentence lengths, so the chance of being caught tends to matter more.

Question 3 of 5 Why might each additional prison place prevent less crime than the one before?

Because prisons get cheaper as they grow Because as incarceration expands, more of the people imprisoned are lower-risk Because prisoners commit more crimes inside prison Because judges stop sentencing violent offenders

This is the idea of diminishing returns to incarceration.

Question 4 of 5 According to the Coase theorem, what happens when property rights are clear and bargaining is costless?

The government must always step in The party with more money always wins The parties reach the efficient outcome whoever holds the legal right No agreement is ever possible

The legal rule then decides who pays whom, but not the final outcome.

Question 5 of 5 What are expectation damages in contract law?

A punishment designed to be much larger than the harm Money meant to put the injured party where they would have been if the promise had been kept A fee paid to the court An order forcing the party to perform the contract

Expectation damages compensate for the lost value of the broken promise, which also allows efficient breach.

← Back to Why Contracts Matter: Trust, Promises and Enforcement Next lesson → Accident Law: Negligence and the Hand Formula

EconReads

We believe knowledge should be open to everyone, not limited by barriers.

econreadsorg@gmail.com
Instagram @econreadsorg

Explore

Home
About
Curriculum
Our Work
News
Support Us
Testimonials

Take action

Donate
Sign our petition
Collaborate with us

© 2026 EconReads. Run by high school students. Built for screen readers, keyboards and everyone else.

Welcome to EconReads

This site is made for visually impaired learners, so our read-aloud reader is already switched on to help you explore hands-free.

You're in control - turn it off any time using the Reader button at the top of the page.

यह साइट दृष्टिबाधित शिक्षार्थियों के लिए बनाई गई है, इसलिए हमारा ज़ोर से पढ़ने वाला रीडर आपको बिना हाथ लगाए घूमने में मदद के लिए पहले से चालू है।

नियंत्रण आपके हाथ में है - पेज के ऊपर मौजूद रीडर बटन से इसे कभी भी बंद करें।

Don't show this message again

EconReader Reading speed Ready